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1969]

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

detention based upon an improper judgment of conviction for
The parties stipulated that
second degree burglary in 1943.
claimant's imprisonment provided a toll until 1959. In 1959 the
claimant was released on parole, but was subsequently reincarcerated eight months later for a parole violation. The court
held that the two year period of limitation prescribed by the
Court of Claims Act began to run upon claimant's release on
parole and continued to run despite claimant's subsequent reincarceration. The action was thus time barred.
ARTICLE 3 -

JURISDICTION AND SEavICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE

OF COURT

CPLR 302.: Possible extension in matrimonial actions.
In Venizelos v. Venizelos,' 0 a separation action, the appellate
division, second department, affirmed the denial of defendant
husband's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and
the allowance of wife's cross-motion for an injunction with
respect to husband's proceedings in Greece. It was found that
the defendant who was married in New York, where the matrimonial domicile was maintained for nine years and where the
children of the marriage resided, was subject to personal jurisdiction although he had returned to his native Greece.
While there is authority for holding that the preparation
and execution of a separation agreement is a transaction of business which will subject an absentee spouse to in personam jurisdiction as to causes of action arising out of it,"" there was no
separation agreement mentioned here. The court stated:
whether defendant was a domiciliary of New York or not at the time
of commencement of this action, it is our opinion that his contacts with
this State and the interests of New York in the litigation are sufficient
to subject him, under the appropriate statutes, to the jurisdiction of our
courts in an action for separation. . . . It was proper . . . to enjoin
defendant from taking any steps to enforce 2the foreign decree and from
instituting an action for divorce in Greece.1
Thus, it appears that a new extension of long-arm jurisdiction
is about to be charted.
The court, however, refused to base its decision entirely on
such tenuous grounds. It was held that the defendant had waived

1030 App. Div. 2d 856, 293 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2d Dep't 1968).
11See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 302, supp. commentary, 104, 106-07 (1967).
12 30 App. Div. 2d 856, 293 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (2d Dep't 1968).
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any objection to personal jurisdiction by the execution of two
stipulations.
CPLR 302(a) (1).: Entering state to receive medical treatment
deemed a transactionof business.
Under CPLR 302 (a) (1), a nondomiciliary who transacts
business in New York subjects himself to personal jurisdiction
as to causes of action arising out of that transaction. 13 As 302 (a)
(1) is continuously applied to novel fact situations, light is shed
on its outer limits.
In Cohen v. Haberkorn,4 the appellate division, second department, recently held that a nondomiciliary who enters the
state to receive medical treatment "transacts business" under
302 (a) (1) and thus becomes amenable to personal jurisdiction
in an action by the physician to recover the value of his services.
CPLR 308(1).:

Court of Appeals rules on redelivery problem.
The Court of Appeals has recently addressed itself to the
problem of whether a summons, originally delivered to an improper
person, is valid if through eventual redelivery it comes into the
possession of the party to be served. In McDonald v. Ames
Supply Co.,' the summons, seeking to secure jurisdiction over
defendant, a foreign corporation, was delivered to a building
receptionist who was not an employee of the defendant. The
receptionist subsequently delivered the summons to a proper party,
but the service was held invalid. (Had the receptionist been
an employee of the defendant, service would probably still have
failed since CPLR 311 provides that service upon a foreign
corporation be made by delivering the summons to "an officer,
director, managing or general agent, or cashier or assistant
casheir.")
The Court stated that generally, original personal delivery
to the wrong person constitutes improper service even though
the summons is shortly received by the correct person. 8 It pointed
out that any other rule would undermine the statutory procedure for setting aside a defectively served summons, since
the motion to set aside is itself evidentiary of eventual receipt
of the summons.
13See generally 7B McKiINNEY's CPLR 302, supp. commentary 104
(1968).
1430 App. Div. 2d 530, 291 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1968).
1522
N.Y.2d 111 ....... N.E.2d ........ , 291 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1968).
'0 See, e.g., Clark v. Fifty Seventh Madison Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 693,
213 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dep't) appeal dismnissed, 10 N.Y.2d 808, 178 N.E.2d
225, 221 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1961); Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Singer
Sewing Mach. Co., 281 App. Div. 867, 119 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1st Dep't 1953).

